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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
in judgment that such an inequitable result occurred. Plaintiffs were aware
of Article 78 and its short statute of limitations period. This, alone, should
have been sufficient notice that the proper course of action was through an
Article 78 proceeding. It was reasonable to believe that the Shlakinan
proceedings would encompass more than four months' time. Plaintiffs should
have been aware that their failure to appeal upon the stipulation would
invoke the rule of res judicata in a new action. The result is not a product of
inadequate procedures, but the product of plaintiffs' own errors. The court
is the forum where the law should be uniformly settled, and not the forum
to correct the errors in judgment of an indefinite amount of litigants.
STATUS OF VETERAN UNDER CIVIL SERVICE LAW I

Section 22 of the Civil Service Law provides that an honorably discharged
veteran shall not be removed from his position unless incompetency or misconduct is shown after a hearing upon specified charges and due notice given.70
This section does not afford protection to one who holds the position of private
secretary. The plaintiff, in Driscoll v. Troy Housing Authority,"1 sought
reinstatement to his position as secretary of the respondent, contending that
Section 22 applied. The Court of Appeals agreed, and reversed the decision
of the Appellate Division."2
Since the plaintiff had never taken a competitive examination, it was
necessary that the Court determine that the plaintiff's position was "exempt"
under the provisions of the Civil Service Law before determining that the position was outside the exception of private secretaries under Section 22.73
Although the exemption provisions in the civil service laws exempt only a
secretary of a "board" or "commission," the Court construed Section 32 of
the Public Housing Laws, which authorizes the Housing Authority to employ
a secretary ". . . subject to the provisions of the civil service law applicable to
the municipality in which it is established . . . ," as making them applicable
to "authorities" as well. Any other construction would necessitate the enactment of separate bodies of civil service provisions for each differently denominated administrative agency. Although the position of secretary is exempt
under Section 13 of the Civil Service Law,74 the Court still had to overcome
the barrier of precedent before it could apply Section 22.
In Mercer v. Dowd,75 on facts similar to the instant case, the Court had
followed the decision in Glassman v. Fries, 6 wherein Section 22's express
70. Now N.Y. Cl. SERv CE LAw § 75.
71. 6 N.Y.2d 513, 190 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1959).
72. 6 A.D.2d 981, 177 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1958).
73. If the plaintiff had not held an exempt position he would have been considered as
holding, or having held, his position unlawfully and not entitled to the protection of
Section 22. The Court construed evidence consisting of a roster card and minutes of
the meeting at which he was appointed as sufficient indication that he was appointed
a Secretary rather than a Director.
74. Now § 41(1)(c).
75. 288 N.Y. 381, 43 N.E.2d 452 (1942).
76. 271 N.Y. 116, 2 N.E.2d 281 (1936).
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denial of protection to private secretaries was construed to apply to all Section
13 secretaries, but added the qualification that it is not the title fastened to
the position that will determine its status, instead, the nature of the duties will
control. In Mercer, as here, the plaintiff performed clerical, supervisory, and
managerial duties, hence Section 22 must be applied here as it was there.
The Court restricted the scope of the Mercer holding in this case by explaining
that its decision there properly involved Section 22 only, since Section 13 was
not germane to the issue. But it is apparent that Section 13 was not in issue
only because of the hoped for application of the Glassman holding which was
not rejected but merely subjected to interpretive qualifications.
The decision, in effect, recognizes the distinction in terminology between
the "private secretary" of Section 22 and the "Secretary" of Section 13. The
holding would have possessed greater clarity had the Court expressly rejected
the sweeping generality of the Glassman case and more precisely indicated that
while a Section 13 secretary may utilize the protection of Section 22 if he
performs clerical, supervisory, and managerial duties, if he has not these duties,
then he is a "private secretary" within the meaning of Section 22.
STATUS OF VETERAN UNDER CIVIL SERVICE LAW

II

New York's Civil Service Law, Section 22, subdivision 1, 7 provides,
among other things, that no honorably discharged veteran of the armed forces
shall be summarily removed from a Civil Service position. However, the same
section excludes from this protection deputies of any official or department.'
In Behringer v. Parisi,78 petitioner, a veteran of World War II, was
summarily removed from his position as District Administrator of the Albany
District of the Workmen's Compensation Board, and brought an action under
Section 22 for reinstatement. The Chairman, however, determined that petitioner was a deputy within the meaning of the section. When review of that
determination was had under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Act the Court of
Appeals held that a hearing was necessary to determine if petitioner was in
fact a deputy within the meaning of Section 22, Subdivision 1.
Petitioner contended that in order to be termed a deputy a statute must
have created his position and prescribed the attendant duties and that no
statute had done so. The Court, however, could not agree with petitioner on
this matter, stating that the requirement was not applicable to the term
"deputy" but rather was meant to apply to the category "independent office"
79
which had been made an exception to the law by the judiciary.
80
As recently as 1950, in Heath v. Creagh, the Court stated that in order
for one to be included in the concept of "deputy" there need be only a statute
77. The Civil Service Law has been revised, effective April 1, 1959. Section 22,
however, has been substantially retained and appears in Section 75 of the revision.
78. 5 N.Y.2d 147, 182 N.Y.S.2d 147 (1959).
79. O'Day v. Yeager, 308 N.Y. 580, 127 N.E.2d 585 (1955).
80. 197 Misc. 537, 547, 96 N.Y.S.2d 247, 255, aff'd 276 App. Div. 948, 94 N.Y.S.2d
901 (4th Dep't 1950).

